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ABSTRACT
Organizations cannot address demographic disparities that they
cannot see. Recent research on machine learning and fairness has
emphasized that awareness of sensitive attributes, such as race and
sex, is critical to the development of interventions. However, on
the ground, the existence of these data cannot be taken for granted.
This paper uses the domains of employment, credit, and health-
care in the United States to surface conditions that have shaped
the availability of sensitive attribute data. For each domain, we
describe how and when private companies collect or infer sensi-
tive attribute data for antidiscrimination purposes. An inconsistent
story emerges: Some companies are required by law to collect sen-
sitive attribute data, while others are prohibited from doing so.
Still others, in the absence of legal mandates, have determined that
collection and imputation of these data are appropriate to address
disparities.
This story has important implications for fairness research and
its future applications. If companies that mediate access to life
opportunities are unable or hesitant to collect or infer sensitive
attribute data, then proposed techniques to detect and mitigate bias
in machine learning models might never be implemented outside
the lab. We conclude that today’s legal requirements and corporate
practices, while highly inconsistent across domains, offer lessons
for how to approach the collection and inference of sensitive data
in appropriate circumstances. We urge stakeholders, including ma-
chine learning practitioners, to actively help chart a path forward
that takes both policy goals and technical needs into account.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Statistical models, including those created with machine learning,
can reproduce biases in the historical data used to train them. As
powerful institutions increase their reliance upon these models to
automate decisions that affect people’s rights and life opportunities,
researchers have begun developing new techniques to help detect
and address these biases. The real-world implementation of these
techniques could be an essential part of ensuring the continued
viability of civil and human rights protections.
Many machine learning fairness practitioners rely on awareness
of sensitive attributes—that is, access to labeled data about people’s
race, ethnicity, sex, or similar demographic characteristics—to test
the efficacy of debiasing techniques or directly implement fairness
interventions. A significant body of research presumes the modeler
has ready access to data on these characteristics as they build and
test their models [13, 19, 21]. The need for this data is plain to see.
As a 2003 analysis of racial disparities in healthcare powerfully
concluded: "The presence of data on race and ethnicity does not,
in and of itself, guarantee any subsequent actions ... to identify
disparities or any actions to reduce or eliminate disparities that are
found. The absence of data, however, essentially guarantees that
none of those actions will occur." [23]
Increasingly, companies that utilize machine learning are being
asked to detect and address bias in their products. But they are not
the first to grapple with these issues. This paper explores the legal
and institutional norms surrounding the collection, inference, and
use of sensitive attribute data in three key corporate domains. This
analysis has significant implications for machine learning fairness
research: If private institutions that mediate access to life opportuni-
ties are unable or hesitant to collect or infer sensitive attribute data,
then emerging awareness-based techniques to detect and mitigate
bias in machine learning models might never be implementable in
real-world settings.
Notably, this paper does not discuss complex and important
questions about how "fairness" should be measured or addressed,
recognizing that definitions are manifold [53]. Rather, we make a
simpler point: If sensitive attribute data are not available, interven-
tions that rely on them will be severely impaired.
We conduct this exploration through the lens of U.S. civil rights
law in the domains of credit, employment, and healthcare. For each
domain, we describe when and how private companies collect or in-
fer sensitive attribute data to pursue antidiscrimination goals. These
are not the only contexts where collection of sensitive attributes is
likely to be justified or important, but they are quintessential areas
where such data are already being used to measure and mitigate
discrimination. They also highlight major divergences in policy,
motivation, and practice.
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Comparing these sectors, a complex and inconsistent story emerges.
In credit, the law requires some lenders to collect sensitive attribute
data, while largely prohibiting others from doing so. In employ-
ment, the collection of sensitive attribute data is a familiar part of
large employers’ day-to-day practice. And in health care, compa-
nies’ motivation for collecting sensitive attribute data is not just
basic antidiscrimination compliance, but rather a moral imperative
to address staggering disparities in health outcomes.
We observe that these norms and practices, divergent as they are,
typically extend only to traditionally regulated actors. Technology
companies that mediate access to opportunities as platforms (e.g.,
social networks, job boards, and rental sites) or act as vendors
to other companies rarely receive clear guidance about when to
collect or infer sensitive attribute data. As a result, today, many
major technology companies do not collect or infer certain kinds of
sensitive attribute data and may therefore struggle to define, detect,
and address harms to those protected groups.
We conclude that there are few clear, generally accepted prin-
ciples about when and why companies should collect sensitive
attribute data for antidiscrimination purposes. We emphasize the
importance of the machine learning research community engaging
on the future development of policy in this area, and urge conversa-
tions among stakeholders about whether and how to adapt existing
practices or establish new ones.
1.1 Defining "sensitive attribute data"
Throughout this paper, we use the term "sensitive attribute data" to
refer to details about people’s membership in "protected classes" as
defined throughout U.S. civil rights laws. This approach to classifi-
cation is not without its problems: Rigid categories such as these
do not currently accommodate nonbinary identities or membership
across multiple groups [3, 34, 37, 51]. We acknowledge the reductive
and potentially harmful nature of these classification regimes, while
simultaneously emphasizing the importance of understanding how
they have motivated data collection practices for bias mitigation,
and how the history of these practices can inform contemporary
contexts.
1.2 Related work
The fair ML research community has long reflected on the social
and policy contexts of its work, recognizing legal tensions [8],
historical parallels in prior debates over definitions of fairness [37],
and the limitations of data-dependent problem formulation [64,
70]. However, when emphasizing the importance of awareness
of sensitive attributes in developing and implementing fairness-
enhancing interventions, fair ML research and toolkits [9, 38, 67]
often take for granted when framing problems and their solutions
that sensitive attribute data are available as inputs [17, 32, 39, 40,
48, 50, 65].
When labeled data are not available, researchers have made pow-
erful discoveries by augmenting existing data through the inference
or construction of labeled data de novo [5, 10, 27, 46]. At times, this
work has insufficiently acknowledged the full range of challenges to
generating or obtaining those data in applied contexts [35, 76, 77].
Veale and Binns [76] and Kilbertus et al [41] propose approaches
to dealing with such information deficits without collecting or
revealing sensitive data. Chen et al propose a method to impute
unavailable protected class data [13]. Veale et al [77] and Holstein
et al [35] outline the contextual needs for implementing fairness.
Zliobaite and Custers use theoretical and linear regression-based
examples to argue that sensitive data must be included in the mod-
eling process in order to avoid discrimination [79]. Focusing on
the European regulatory environment, their study distinguishes
between direct and indirect discrimination, but does not address
how different sectoral laws enable or prevent detection of either
type.
This paper aims to bridge gaps between theoretical approaches
and practical constraints, extracting lessons for fair ML practition-
ers from three real-world case studies.
2 CASE STUDIES
2.1 Credit
United States federal law prohibits creditors from discriminating on
the basis of certain protected characteristics. However, across the
credit sector, there are sharply divergent approaches to collecting
sensitive attribute data. On one hand, mortgage lenders are required
to collect such data from their borrowers. On the other, consumer
lenders are largely prohibited from doing so. The reason for this
difference is not immediately apparent, and likely turns on historical
details underlying the development of overlapping legal doctrines.
2.1.1 Background. In the mid-1970s, policymakers acknowledged
that discriminatory practices in the consumer credit and home
mortgage industries shut out women, people of color, low-income
groups, and others from accessing these vital economic resources.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), passed in 1974, initially
made discrimination on the bases of marital status and sex illegal,
and was later expanded to include other protected groups. The fol-
lowing year, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) similarly
made discriminating against low-income homemortgage borrowers
illegal. Like ECOA, HMDA grew to encompass categories including
race, gender, and national origin through subsequent amendments.
The origins of ECOA trace back to an era when lenders required
unmarried women to have male cosigners on their loans. From the
outset, regulators feared that mandatory collection of protected
class data beyond gender for the purpose of detecting discrimi-
natory lending might itself facilitate such practices. Thus, under
ECOA, the collection of these data is banned. Regulation B, which
implements ECOA, has made exceptions for some voluntary collec-
tion of data on applicants’ color, national origin, religion, race, and
sex as "monitoring information" in instances where lenders conduct
self-testing to determine whether loans are not being granted to
individuals on discriminatory grounds.
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) twice considered amendments
to ECOA that would allow voluntary collection of protected class
data for non-mortgage loan applicants in order to surface discrimi-
natory lending decisions. In 1995, the first proposal to lift the ban
on collecting sensitive attribute data garnered a mix of support
and opposition. Noting that discrimination on protected class bases
only covered a limited set of criteria for potential disparate treat-
ment during in-person lending scenarios, supporters of the change
pointed to the successful identification and reduction of biased
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mortgage lending decisions that resulted from HMDA’s strict data
collection practices [74]. These advocates disagreed with the FRB’s
long-held claim that recording these data would lead to discrimina-
tion in consumer lending, noting that this predicted harm did not
unfold in the home mortgage industry.
The argument that voluntary collection of protected character-
istic information would lead to discriminatory lending persisted,
however, in large part due to credit industry representatives’ com-
plaint letters opposing the amendments. Banks and other lending
institutions were not inclined to support a measure that would incur
higher costs and stricter reporting standards and presumably may
have revealed discriminatory practices. They additionally warned
that being asked about sensitive attributes could deter some minor-
ity applicants. In response to these public comments following the
proposed amendment in 1995, the FRB decided to leave the decision
about collecting protected class data up to Congress.
After introducing a second proposal to remove the ban on col-
lecting these data in 1998, the FRB once again determined in 2003
that consumer lending institutions should not gather this informa-
tion. Standing by their original conviction that sensitive attribute
information collection would lead to outright discrimination, the
FRB also reasoned that making this a voluntary action could result
in incomplete data collection and inconsistent data formatting that
would hinder cross-market comparison between creditors [74].
The ECOA’s evolutionwas inmanyways the opposite of HMDA’s
expansive push to seek evidence of unfair practices in the mortgage
lending industry. HMDA grew out of home mortgage depository
institutions’ disproportionate withdrawal of investments in largely
urban areas from which they drew their deposits: a form of redlin-
ing that devitalized older neighborhoods, since residents could not
access the credit required to sell and refurbish their homes [42].
HMDA’s initial reporting requirements involved publicizing ge-
ographic data about lending patterns. As the contexts and causes
of home mortgage lending discrimination changed, HMDA was
amended between 1980 and the early ’00s to expand the scope of in-
stitutions covered and to call for reporting of sensitive attribute data
on borrowers’ gender, race, income, and other categories. When
regulators determined these data were insufficient to demonstrate
discrimination, they called for further data collection including data
about rejected applications and loan pricing.
2.1.2 Data practices. While ECOA prohibits collection of sensitive
attribute data for most purposes, its implementing regulations al-
low banks and "anyone who, in the ordinary course of business,
regularly participates in decisions about whether or not to extend
credit or how much credit to extend" to collect, in a narrow set of
circumstances, sensitive attribute data on individuals applying for
non-mortgage loans [71]. If lenders opt to collect this data, they
must indicate that the information is being recorded for self-testing
and monitoring purposes. If an applicant prefers not to provide
their race and sex information, the lender is allowed to make their
own determinations of these characteristics from visual observation
and surname analysis. If the self-test demonstrates that the institu-
tion may have violated ECOA, the lender must attempt to identify
the cause and extent of the violation. Save for in some instances,
the results of the self-test are considered privileged information
that government agencies cannot access in investigations related
to ECOA transgressions.
HMDA, by contrast, requires expansive collection of both sensi-
tive attribute data and related mortgage loan application data that
can be used to build arguments that discrimination has occurred.
Under HMDA, protected data that must be collected as part of a
Loan/Application Register (LAR) include sex, race, and ethnicity,
with additional requirements that data on income, loan amount and
type, property location, and reasons for loan denial (among others)
must be reported [42]. Lenders are allowed to use visual observa-
tion and surname analysis to guess the sex, race, and ethnicity of
applicants who choose not to self-identify these traits. The data are
published in different formats depending on the intended recipient.
Lenders submit these data to the FRB annually, whereas if a mem-
ber of the public requested access they would be presented with a
modified LAR scrubbed of any identifying information. Finally, the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) creates
disclosure statements for each lender based on their LAR data, and
publishes openly available aggregate reports of HMDA data at city,
national, and census-tract levels.
2.1.3 Results and reactions. The question of whether sensitive
attribute data should be collected to detect discrimination in con-
sumer lending remains controversial. As one scholar put it, "Even if
computerized credit scoring arguably has the potential to eliminate
disparate treatment results, disparate impact discrimination may
still occur" [74]. Another scholar has suggested creditors should
be required to conduct self-testing using sensitive attribute data.[4]
Lenders and other proponents of credit scoring systems may argue
that expanded collection of data on race and other protected class
characteristics would be insufficient to prove discrimination given
the increasing complexity of how credit scores are calculated.
Today, as was the case when ECOA was passed, the absence of
sensitive attribute data makes it difficult to document and mitigate
inequitable consumer lending practices. For example, one of the
few, robust public studies on credit scores and discrimination in the
United States was performed by the FRB in 2007, at the direction of
Congress [56]. To conduct its analysis, the FRB created a database
that, for the first time, combined sensitive attribute data collected
by the Social Security Administration (SSA) with a large, nationally
representative sample of individuals’ credit records. The FRB noted
its study was unique in part because of the lack of sensitive attribute
data in this domain, and this unusual undertaking would not have
been possible without significant governmental time and resources.
The shortage of sensitive attribute data in the consumer lending
space also complicates regulatory enforcement. For example, in
2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the
Department of Justice found that Ally Financial, an auto lending
firm, overcharged over 230,000 minority borrowers on their car
loans. Two years later, the CFPB required Ally Financial to send
checks from its $80 million settlement to customers believed to have
unfairly paid higher prices for their loans [66]. Lacking access to
data on which exact individuals had overpaid, however, the CFPB in-
stead used a Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) method
to predict which customers were likely to be racial minorities, and
were therefore more likely to be victims of Ally Financial’s allegedly
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discriminatory pricing. Although BISG’s probabilistic means of us-
ing publicly available surnames and geographical information as
proxies for race and ethnicity is regarded as among the most ad-
vanced technique of its kind [11], it is not without flaws. In the use
of BISG during the Ally Financial payout, some white Americans
were misidentified as having been overcharged for car loans on a
discriminatory basis and received compensatory checks [7]. Had
data collection practices in non-mortgage lending included sensi-
tive attributes, such mistakes could have been averted. Moreover,
predictive power of these techniques might diminish over time if
housing and marital segregation patterns change.
By contrast, the amendments to HMDA that spurred collection
of protected class data came into effect in 1990, and data from
1992 reflected a significant rise in mortgage lending to low- and
moderate-income and minority communities [49]. Moreover, in
the longer term, the publication of the 1991 data fueled commu-
nity activism and helped change home mortgage lenders’ practices.
Making HMDA data mutually accessible to lending institutions and
community organizations is correlated with beneficial outcomes
for banks and borrowers alike [20]. However, it remains difficult
to know for certain to what extent this data led to reductions in
discriminatory lending practices or merely documented changes
that were already underway.
2.2 Employment
United States federal law prohibits employers and employment
agencies from discriminating on the basis of certain protected at-
tributes. In this context, the collection of demographic information
is a familiar part of most employers’ day-to-day practice. For ex-
ample, many large employers are required to collect demographic
data about job applicants and employees to facilitate regulatory
enforcement and research. And for many decades, employment
selection procedures have been subject to regulatory guidelines
that assume "adverse impact" can be readily quantified.
2.2.1 Background. Following sustained, nationwide demands to
end racial discrimination and segregation, Congress passed sweep-
ing protections in the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Title VII of the Act
pertains specifically to employment, prohibiting employers from
directly or indirectly discriminating in their employment practices
and laying out expectations around data collection and reporting
for enforcement purposes. The following year, President Lyndon
B. Johnson signed Executive Order 11246, which prohibits federal
contractors from discriminating in employment decisions, and also
requires employers to take affirmative action to increase the repre-
sentation of women and minorities in their workforces. The order,
enforced by the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCCP), also outlines related requirements around the
documentation of recruitment activities, including the collection of
demographic information about job applicants and employees in
order to facilitate the detection of discrimination at different points
in the recruitment pipeline.
Title VII requires employers and other covered entities to "make
and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether
unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed,"
as defined by the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC), which enforces the law [1]. Since employers may be liable
for employment practices that result in disparate impact on the basis
of protected categories including race and gender, EEOC guidance
points to Title VII as a legal basis for requiring the collection of
applicant data as necessary to detect, mitigate, or defend against
claims of disparate impact. The UniformGuidelines on Employment
Selection Procedures, which reflects the U.S. government’s unified
position on employment tests, detail how employment tests must
be evaluated for unjustified adverse impact on the basis of race,
sex, or ethnicity. The EEOC may allow employers to use selection
procedures with disparate impact provided that the procedure has
been "validated" according to these guidelines [31].
In order to support enforcement of these legal protections, mon-
itor progress in workplace diversity, and enable employer self-
assessment, the EEOC also requires private employers with 100 or
more employees and contractors with more than 50 employees to
collect aggregate statistics about the demographics of their work-
force and report them to regulators on a yearly basis, known as
EEO-1 reports.
2.2.2 Data practices. Collection of sensitive attribute data in the
employment sector is highly standardized, reflecting well-defined
federal reporting requirements.
For EEO-1 reports, employers must collect data on sex, a bi-
nary field (male or female), as well as race, divided into predefined
categories of Black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, American In-
dian/Alaskan Native, white, or "two or more races" [16]. These
categories were last updated in 2005 (after 40 years), and in 2007 the
EEOC advised that employers were permitted—but not required—to
collect more detailed demographic data [55, 63]. Employers must
offer employees the opportunity to voluntarily self-identify in the
predefined categories. If and only if an employee declines to self-
identify, the employer may use "employment records or observer
identification," elsewhere described as "visual surveys of the work-
force" to categorize the worker to complete their reporting require-
ments [16].
Although not all employers are required to track sensitive at-
tributes from job applicants, many opt to solicit this information
at the time of application, and federal contractors are required to
do so. Contractors may solicit demographic data from applicants at
any time during the employee selection process so long as the data
is solicited from all applicants. Regulators advise that "voluntary
self-reporting or self-identification is still generally the preferred
method for collecting data on race, ethnicity, and gender, but in
situations where self-reporting is not practicable or feasible, ob-
server information may be used to identify race, ethnicity, and
gender" [62]. After making "reasonable efforts to identify applicant
gender, race, and ethnicity information," contractors may record
the applicant’s race and gender as "unknown"—with the exception
that employers may visually identify applicants "when the appli-
cant appears in person and declines to self-identify" [61]. Notably,
employers may not use these data as a part of their employment
selection procedures, but may use them to evaluate outcomes and
inform changes to those procedures.
2.2.3 Results and reactions. As of 2017, nearly 70 thousand em-
ployers file EEO-1 reports per year, documenting data for over 50
million employees [14]. Multiple studies have used EEO and other
sources of demographic data to measure trends in occupational
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segregation, finding that it has declined since the passage of Title
VII [44, 69, 78]. Others use this data to more closely examine race
and sex inequality in managerial positions and within specific in-
dustries, as well as gender and racial pay gaps [36, 45, 69]. Several
researchers were able to determine that OFCCP monitoring and
enforcement in particular likely contributed to greater representa-
tion of Black workers in skilled occupations [47]. The EEOC and
OFCCP themselves commonly use EEO-1 and other mandatorily
collected data to support investigations of individual and systemic
employment discrimination [15, 75].
Some have pointed out that unlike other government survey
instruments, the EEOC merges data on race and ethnicity, which
may lead to measurement errors [69]. Others critique the allowance
of observed data, but concede that because observed data relate to
how workers may be perceived, these data may still have utility
in understanding employment discrimination [72]. However, we
identified relatively little criticsm of the overall exercise of collect-
ing sensitive attribute data in the context of employment, perhaps
because the law requiring and justifying their collection is so clear.
Here again, it is not clear that the relationship between demo-
graphic data collection and any occupational desegregation is a
causal one. Without this disaggregated employment data, however,
documentation of these trends would be significantly more diffi-
cult. Indeed, researchers have found that while EEO-1 data do have
some constraints, they can be a particularly powerful tool to study
workplace inequality and segregation, especially as compared with
other data sources [69].
2.3 Health
United States federal law prohibits discrimination in the provision
of various health care services. For example, those who qualify for
federal health insurance programs such as Medicare or Medicaid
may not be subjected to discrimination based on certain sensitive
attributes. However, unlike in credit and employment, a major
driving factor behind collection of sensitive attribute data in this
sector has been voluntary industry efforts to address racial and
ethnic disparities in health outcomes, rather than compliance with
antidiscrimination laws alone.
2.3.1 Background. The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and
the establishment of Medicare the following year created a need
for data to confirm that patients had equal access to health care
and that hospitals were not segregated. As a result, many hospitals
initially collected data about sensitive attributes for compliance
purposes only [68].
A shift in approach was prompted not long after by Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) Margaret Heckler’s observa-
tion in a 1983 national health report that minority health lagged
behind that of white Americans, and the subsequent formation of
the Task Force on Black and Minority Health to research this gap.
The 1986 publication of the Report of the Secretary’s Task Force on
Black and Minority Health (Heckler Report) marked the first study
highlighting the significant health disparities racial minorities ex-
perienced in the U.S. [57]. Although the Heckler Report’s findings
drew awareness to racial inequality in healthcare provision, they
did not themselves effect a shift away from compliance-based sen-
sitive attribute data collection toward a model of using these data
to reduce discrimination.
At the request of Congress in 2003, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) published a follow-up report, Unequal Treatment, affirming
that unacceptable levels of racial and ethnic disparities in health
outcomes persisted [60]. The IOM report concluded that without
data on patients’ race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and primary
language, it would be impossible for healthcare providers to detect
or address these disparities, and recommended the systematic col-
lection and reporting of race and ethnicity data as a critical step
toward eliminating them.
The IOM report jump-started health insurance and other care
providers’ joint, voluntary effort to collect and use data for health-
care quality improvement and disparity reduction [68]. Organi-
zations such as the National Health Plan Collaborative (NHPC)
connected health research institutes to national and regional health
plans in order for the former to provide these firms with educational
tools and recommendations for how to detect and mitigate discrim-
ination [73]. While initially, many insurance providers believed
collecting race and ethnicity data was illegal, legal analysis deter-
mined that collection was justified under (though not explicitly
required by) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Affordable Care
Act, as well as several state laws. Under these statutes, health plans
are prohibited from using demographic data for discriminatory
purposes, including steering patients toward certain healthcare
products [18, 43]. However, health plans are allowed to use these
data in order to report aggregate trends and join initiatives to pro-
vide equitable services.
2.3.2 Data practices. Some health providers have found it neces-
sary to collect data on patients’ race, ethnicity, and primary spoken
language (REL) to identify health care disparities [23]. However,
there is substantial variability in the precise categories and level of
granularity different health providers opt to use to do so. Industry-
wide efforts to standardize these data are ongoing.
Physicians and hospitals often collect REL data at intake—usually
by asking patients directly, though sometimes determined by intake
specialist observation [28]. Health plans, on the other hand, tend
to use surveys and incentive programs to collect data after people
have signed up for coverage. In some cases, insurers are prohibited
from asking for race/ethnicity data during the sign-up process
[25, 29]. Some health providers also appear to be able to share and
obtain data from federal agencies (e.g. Medicaid), though the exact
mechanics of this process remain obscure.
Policymakers and practitioners recognize that in general, data
that patients self-report are strongly preferred [24, 33], but in prac-
tice, providers have struggled to convince most patients to volun-
tarily self-report. In the interest of generating data necessary to
reduce disparities, methods to estimate race and ethnicity have
been widely adopted to supplement self-reported data [54]. Early
inference methods involved basic geocoding and surname analysis;
more advanced probabilistic techniques have since been developed
to refine these estimates. These algorithms produce probabilities
that individuals belong to a particular racial or ethnic group, which
can then be used to assess disparities between subgroups at an
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aggregate level [29, 68]. A number of health plans combine self-
reported and estimated data to increase accuracy of their analysis
[54].
Experts have recommended that race/ethnicity data based on
indirect estimation methods should be stored separately from or
be clearly marked in medical systems. Inferred data should not be
placed in individuals’ clinical medical records—that is, probabilistic
methods should not be used to assign someone a particular race or
ethnicity classification [68]—but should only be used for aggregate
statistical analysis [25]. The IOM recommended that when possible,
estimations should be accompanied by their respective probabili-
ties [68]. Whether actual data management practice follows these
recommendations likely varies by institution.
2.3.3 Results and reactions. While significant healthcare disparities
remain, they have narrowed since the publication of the IOM report
thatmotivated increased data collection [22, 59]. Moreover, granular
data has enabled ongoing monitoring and benchmarking of health
outcomes, motivated substantial scientific and policy research, and
supported federal, state, local, industry, and practitioner-driven
disparity reduction initiatives.
Although many health plans have internal policies on confiden-
tiality and use of race/ethnicity data [30], low rates of participation
in voluntary data collection may indicate continued lack of trust
in healthcare institutions that collect these data, and fear that de-
mographic data might be used to discriminate against patients or
otherwise be misused [33]. Health plans have admitted that they
sometimes hesitate to collect data for fear of being accused of dis-
crimination [25], on top of other challenges like privacy concerns,
IT limitations, and inconsistency or insensitivity in the available
categories [54]. But many healthcare providers circumvent these
challenges by using techniques to generate demographic data in a
probabilistic manner.
Critiques of direct and indirect data collection efforts in health-
care have also emerged on the grounds that concepts of race and
ethnicity are merely sociopolitical constructs [25], and therefore
categorizing patients using those constructs may reinforce and cal-
cify them. However, the broadly recognized harms of race- and
ethnicity-related health disparities seem to have outweighed this
critical perspective for the time being.
3 DISCUSSION
Clearly, debates about collection of sensitive attribute data for an-
tidiscrimination purposes are not new. There are decades of prece-
dent that can inform the machine learning fairness research com-
munity, the broader technology industry, and other stakeholders.
It is important to reiterate that our case studies do not indi-
cate whether collection of sensitive attribute data has contributed
causally to more fair and equitable outcomes. A more fulsome anal-
ysis of this question remains for future work. However, we remain
convinced that measurement is often a precondition for meaningful
improvements.
While the case studies above merely scratch the surface, they
offer some important insights. First, they show that U.S. legal frame-
works do not offer consistent, extensible guidance about when and
how corporations should collect sensitive attribute data. Rather,
there are divergent and sometimes contradictory approaches: Some
companies are required to collect sensitive data to comply with
antidiscrimination laws, while others are explicitly prohibited from
doing so. Second, they show that companies’ primary incentives
for collecting sensitive attribute data may not—and need not—be
compliance or legal requirements at all. The healthcare industry is
one such example. Here, deliberate, sustained, and ongoing debates
on data collection and inference practices across the industry and
stakeholder communities were needed to align on an approach to
combating disparities.
If awareness-based techniques remain a primary approach to bias
mitigation in predictive modelling, there is a need to thoughtfully
consider what efforts must be undertaken to expand collection of
sensitive attribute data in a responsible manner.
3.1 Lessons regarding traditionally regulated
companies
For traditionally regulated entities like banks and employers, mod-
ernization or clarification of laws and regulatory guidance may be
needed to encourage the collection of sensitive attribute data for
new antidiscrimination efforts. Because these companies can be
liable for discriminatory outcomes, they are unlikely to voluntarily
collect or analyze sensitive attribute data that could introduce new
vectors for liability. Thus, they might resist legal reforms that make
it easier to collect sensitive attribute data.
Looking ahead, policymakers, researchers, and and civil soci-
ety will need to work together to assess what kinds of sensitive
attribute data are needed to protect people against discrimination
and create the policy conditions for that collection to occur. These
stakeholders will need to consider what data ought to be collected
and in what form, and the appropriate scope of "safe harbor" pro-
visions to incentivize thorough and transparent study. These are
not clear or settled questions, even with decades of practice under
longstanding civil rights laws.
3.2 Lessons regarding less regulated companies
Many technology platform companies, including those using mod-
els tomediate access to important life opportunities, are not squarely
covered by civil rights laws. These companies often operate as in-
ternet intermediaries, and thus enjoy some special legal protections
from liability arising from content posted by third party users [26].
Nonetheless, many are grappling with how to prevent bias. For
example:
• Airbnb recently assembled "a permanent team of engineers,
data scientists, researchers, and designers whose sole pur-
pose is to advance belonging and inclusion and to root out
bias" [52]. The announcement came on the heels of reports of
discrimination against African Americans seeking housing
opportunities on its platform. The company has not yet pub-
licly discussed the details of this work, or whether it collects
or infers sensitive attribute data in its efforts to combat dis-
crimination. However, it is difficult to imagine an approach
that would avoid these questions.
• Facebook, in delivering advertisements on its platform, in-
troduces demographic skews along gender and race lines [5].
This practice is currently being challenged in court by the
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United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) [58]. Furthermore, as part of a legally enforce-
able settlement with civil rights organizations, Facebook
recently committed to studying the potential for unintended
biases in algorithmic modeling [6]. However, this research
will likely be impossible without collecting or inferring sen-
sitive attributes of the company’s users. It is not yet clear
how Facebook will approach this issue.
• LinkedIn, in an effort to promote equity in hiring, recently
updated its recruiter tools to balance the gender distribution
in candidate search results, rather than sorting candidates
purely by "relevance" [12]. With this update, if the pool of
potential candidates who fit an employer’s search parameters
reflects a certain proportion of women, LinkedIn will re-
rank candidates so that every page of search results reflects
that proportion. The company also plans to offer employers
reports that track the gender breakdown of their candidates
across several stages of the recruitment process, as well as
comparisons to the gender makeup of peer companies. These
features rely on inferring gender data about jobseekers on
the platform, which the company was already doing for
advertising purposes.
It’s not surprising that each of the above examples was motivated
by some combination of public pressure or litigation. Technology
companies are unsure about what kinds of sensitive attribute col-
lection are appropriate. As a result, the path of least resistance is
to simply not to collect or infer data that may create controversy
or highlight disparities that may be difficult to address. This is es-
pecially true given that perceived violations of privacy are likely
to garner intensive media coverage, or where applicable, increased
attention from regulators. It will likely fall to a wide range of stake-
holders, including advocates, researchers, and policymakers, to
ensure that sensitive attribute data is collected and used under
appropriate circumstances.
3.3 The need for multidisciplinary
collaboration
The implementation of awareness-based antidiscrimination ap-
proaches cannot, and should not, move forward without robust
involvement of public interest, technical, and regulatory stakehold-
ers. Even amid clear and compelling risks of discrimination or
unjust demographic disparities, it can be difficult for policymakers
to recommend the collection of sensitive attribute data. There is
no evidence this issue will become easier in the future, despite the
rapid adoption of machine learning models involved in important
life decisions for which these data may be critical to prevent harm.
Privacy laws can sometimes sit in tension with antidiscrimina-
tion goals, and might prevent well-meaning actors from collecting
data that are necessary to detect and remediate bias in machine
learning-based models. Privacy advocates will need to ensure that
new legal requirements around data minimization and restrictions
on the processing of sensitive data do not deter or impede com-
panies from good faith self-testing and bias remediation. At least
one recent U.S. legislative proposal provides an explicit exception
for such testing [2], reinforcing the need for more detailed imple-
mentation guidance. Meanwhile, European laws and norms diverge
significantly from the U.S. approach, prioritizing privacy heavily
over awareness-based antidiscrimination approaches [79]. Private
entities may need to navigate conflicting laws, guidance, and public
expectations across social and geopolitical contexts.
Finally, there is no shortage of critical questions that still need
to be answered:
• When should sensitive attribute data be collected? Given the
practices described above, non-industry actors should con-
sider under what conditions, if any, they would trust certain
private actors with sensitive attribute data that are needed
for antidiscrimination efforts. It’s obvious that data collec-
tion would be justified in some contexts, but the risks may
outweigh potential benefits in others. It’s far less obvious
(and beyond the scope of this paper to suggest) where those
lines should be drawn. These norms are especially unsettled
for technology companies, who have not had the same histor-
ical obligations as traditionally regulated entities, and suffer
from significant trust deficits around their data practices.
• How should sensitive attribute data be created? Sensitive at-
tribute data can be collected directly from subjects or inferred
from non-sensitive data. However, inference presents chal-
lenges around consent, forced classification, and error. Stake-
holders must work together to determine under what condi-
tions inference is acceptable, appropriate inference method-
ologies, and how to treat inferred data responsibly. The cases
considered in this paper offer instructive approaches, includ-
ing retaining probabilistic values and uncertainty in inferred
data, clearly marking when data are observed or inferred,
and storing inferred data separately from data collected with
permission. Other approaches might include enforceable
commitments to use these data only for detecting and miti-
gating discrimination.
• How should sensitive attribute data be treated and secured?
Ideally, sensitive data would be stored separately from other
data and used only for limited purposes, but such techni-
cal safeguards may be difficult to guarantee. New privacy-
protective techniques to access sensitive attribute data, in-
cluding secure multi-party computation tools like private
set intersection and homomorphic encryption, may allow
companies to securely sequester these sensitive data from
general purpose user data, or even enable trusted third par-
ties to collect, infer, or hold sensitive data while making their
insights available to the private entities whose products im-
plicate people’s rights [76]. However, these techniques are
still nascent and have yet to be broadly deployed for the
purpose of bias testing or mitigation.
4 CONCLUSION
Policy debates about the collection and use of sensitive attribute
data will decide the fate of awareness-based bias mitigation tech-
niques. There is an urgent need for machine learning scholars to
drive these conversations forward, along with other stakeholders,
so policy and technical approaches can be developed in accordance
with each other. The ability to detect and address bias in algorithms—
and the durability of foundational civil rights protections—may
hang in the balance.
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